Abstract. Trans-European transport networks in the European Union have been based on plans submitted by the member states, in most cases already existing plans. One of the largest elements is the planned North European High Speed Rail Network (Paris -Brussels -Koln -Amsterdam -London). This involves five member states, of which one, France, has completed its contribution. Part of the Belgian contribution is under construction, and agreement has been reached on the northern and eastern extensions beyond Brussels. In the United Kingdom the contribution is the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The planning has already taken nearly ten years and has involved conflicts over route choice, station location choice, environmental issues, and detailed local planning. These include vertical conflicts between national, regional, and local governments and horizontal conflicts between regional and local governments. As it is an international link there are both vertical (EU) and horizontal (inter-national government and inter-local government) issues to be resolved. In this paper we provide a detailed analysis of the issues and the procedures used to resolve identified conflicts and attempt an evaluation of the current procedure for assessing projects of this type.
Introduction
The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) is the British section of the North European High Speed Rail Network or PBKAL (Paris-Brussels-Koln-Amsterdam-London), which is planned to connect the 110 km (68 mi) between Cheriton, near Folkestone, and London. PBKAL is part of one of the Trans-European Networks (TENs) in the European Union (see Community of European Railways, 1990; Ross, 1994; Vickerman, 1994; 1995) and involves five member states, of which one, France, has already completed its contribution. Part of the Belgian contribution, the section from Lille (France) to Brussels, was opened for service in December 1997, and agreement has been reached on the northern and eastern extensions beyond Brussels into the Netherlands and Germany (for details see Vickerman, 1997) .
Despite the international character of the network, the detailed planning of each section has been subject to the different planning procedures of each country. For the CTRL there have been problems or situations of conflict at various stages of the planning process. It is extremely difficult to define conflict in absolute terms, though it is convenient to subdivide it into intrapersonal and interpersonal. In most cases we must accept poorer results for some criteria in order to achieve better results for others. A decisionmaker has an intrapersonal conflict when none of the possible alternatives available to him or her is best on all counts; that is, no alternative is characterised by the optimal values of all the criteria chosen to classify the stated objectives (refer to Bogetoft and Pruzan, 1991) . The emphasis on 'intra' is intended to differentiate such conflicts from the more traditional concept of conflict as occurring between individuals because of differences in their preferences or perhaps the difficulties in their definition and communication of these. This form of conflict is referred to as interpersonal and is our main focus in this paper. The issues of conflict discussed here have included problems over routing of various sections of the line, the number and location of international and domestic stations, and detailed local planning.
Here we examine some of the conflicts encountered during the discussion of CTRL in the British planning system. A methodology is proposed which classifies the conflicts between different interest groups (policy units) as a framework for their later evaluation and the analysis of their resolution.
The CTRL Hybrid Bill received Royal Assent (parliamentary approval) in December 1996 after scrutiny by the Select Committees of the House of Commons and House of Lords following nearly ten years of planning and conflict resolution. It is at the Select Committee stage that opponents who have a direct interest or are affected by the project are given the opportunity to petition formally (in writing or orally) for changes to the detail (but not the principle) of the Bill. Some 1000 petitions were submitted (compared with nearly 5000 in the case of the Channel Tunnel), of which many supported the Bill in principle and simply sought detailed local changes. Following this, the project ran into severe financial difficulties in early 1998 leading to a further delay. This was resolved only after government intervention and the introduction of new partners, including the national rail infrastructure company Railtrack. The solution involves the line being built in two sections with work on the second phase, the more expensive section between London and just south of the Thames near Dartford, only commencing after the first phase has been completed. Construction of the first phase began in October 1998; final completion may be as late as 2007, almost 20 years after the project was first mooted. The longer Spanish AVE route was agreed and in service within five years.
(1) During this protracted planning procedure decisions had to be made concerning the route of the CTRL through the County of Kent and the London boroughs. This has involved conflicts between interested parties (policy units) at various levels of the planning hierarchy. These conflicts involve vertical conflicts between national, regional, and local governments and horizontal conflicts between regional and local governments. The three main issues involving both vertical and horizontal conflict resolution have been the crossing over the River Medway, the route through Ashford, and the location of intermediate stations along the route. Other areas of conflict related to the choice of the final terminal in London, the detailed route through London, and detailed vertical and horizontal alignments at particular locations, but these are not discussed further in this paper.
We first explore a methodological framework intended to help identify and classify the interactions between the objectives of the spatial policy units, thus highlighting conflicts that may manifest themselves during the planning process and following the outcomes of the decisions made from these processes. An analysis is then given of the conflicts relating to the CTRL and a classification is attempted. Last, we discuss the outcomes of the decisions made.
Classifying conflicts
Planning decisions are often characterised by conflicting goals and objectives of the various policymakers involved. In terms of identifying conflicts, it is the interest groups/ stakeholders that represent interested parties which are of particular concern. Policy units are defined as those units having the power to make a decision and implement a policy. Therefore those groups, such as affected parties, residents, and action groups, whose aim is to influence decisions but have no statutory power or other constitutional power in the decisionmaking process, do not constitute policy units. Instead this group are referred to as stakeholders. Policymakers include elected bodies such as county councils, district/borough councils, or purely administrative authorities. They also include bodies such as the Countryside Commission, English Heritage, English Nature, the Environmental Agency, the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments of England,
(1) Paragraph amended 13 October 1998. The framework in which these policy units are represented is shown as the 'stack' diagram in figure 1 . The left-hand side of this figure, 'objectives', presents the relationship between the various policy units involved in the decisionmaking process. It enables us to represent diagrammatically the objectives of each policy unit involved in the particular decision, thus allowing us to see more clearly inconsistencies and, therefore, potential conflicts which may not have been clear during the decisionmaking process and may not have been identified as a possible reason for the planning delays. The right-hand side of the stack diagram, 'outcomes', identifies the positive and negative outcomes of the decisions made on the different policy units involved. Examples of these outcomes may be the effects on the community, the amount of habitat loss, or the economic repercussions (which could be positive or negative). Some of these outcomes may be difficult to represent spatially. For example, it is difficult to map the economic benefits of a particular route, as these may be enjoyed by the owners of businesses, and by their employees, who may have residences distributed over a wide area, or by shareholders in these businesses who may live outside the area being analysed. Figure 1 presents conflicts in a spatial context, either horizontally or vertically. Horizontal conflicts occur between policy units at the same spatial scale (between local authorities), whereas vertical conflicts occur between policy units at different spatial scales (such as between national and regional government). However, it becomes clear that there are two further dimensions which have to be considered before we can classify individual conflicts, one of which we term value or impact conflicts and the other of which we term actual or potential conflicts. These are not overtly spatial, but will have a critical impact on the spatial evaluation of a project.
Value factors relate to different evaluations of the same outcome by different groups. Thus, for example, it is well established that values of time will differ with income, and a given project will be valued differently according to the income group it affects most. Impact factors reflect the fact that a given project will have different impacts on different people. The choice of a particular alignment will affect one group of people, and a different alignment will affect another group. If these groups have similar values, then the conflict which arises is purely an impact factor; if they have different values, then the conflict is partly an impact conflict and partly a value conflict. It is important to consider the balance between these two factors when evaluating the spatial and distributional importance of decisions. This is especially true for the route choice of the CTRL project as this decision will have very important spatial and distributional outcomes.
There is a further distinction to be made between actual and potential conflicts. Actual conflicts need decision options to be evaluated, whereas potential conflicts occur when people have different views and values, but in circumstances where this does not necessarily lead to an actual conflict. If, for instance, despite two parties or policy units having different values, they both select the same option, albeit for different reasons, there is a potential value conflict but it is not actualised. In this case it is not a matter of conflict resolution but rather of conflict dissolution. Hence, just identifying choices with different impacts affecting groups with different values does not mean that there will be a conflict to resolve.
Analysing the conflicts 3.1 The Medway crossing
The section of the CTRL route corridor which runs between Gravesend and Maidstone transverses the North Downs for a large part of its distance (figure 2). This has raised problems over the detailed route of the CTRL through this section owing to its sensitivity in terms of the natural environment, visual intrusion, and the existence of historic sites. The first route option, published in 1991 (the published route), ran directly from the M20 at Detling to the M2 corridor south of the Borough of Gravesham, but at the expense of two long tunnels under the North Downs. A number of route options have subsequently been developed to meet the Government's remit. The reference case route proposed in March 1993 follows the flatter land, on the surface, south of the published route, running parallel to the foot of the Downs and passing through Detling, Figure 2 . Alternative routes over the Medway.
Boxley (at ground level), Eccles, and Burham, before crossing the River Medway on a viaduct. It then turns northwestwards to pass through a number of short tunnels before rejoining the published route. Various tunnel options have also been developed which incorporate different lengths of tunnel through the North Downs to the north of the publishedToute, ahd^which eros¥lri^Medway^ ~~~-These route choices were considered and resolved during the initial six-month period of consultation on the route and were published in the British Railways Board Report (Union Railways, 1993) . This proposed a route with detailed alignment, a review of the costs, and an assessment of the regeneration possibilities of the project. The public consultation that followed during numerous meetings with local authorities, statutory agencies, action groups, parish councils, and members of the public involved close examination of the details of the route and its alignment. Numerous discussions also took place with Members of Parliament, and the Minister of State chaired a number of meetings of the High Level Forum with leading local-authority representatives. This procedure ended with a further report to the Government in October 1993, in the hope of leading to a final Government decision in time for the Hybrid Bill to be introduced to parliament in March 1994.
During the final decisions between the published route and the long tunnel option (referred to here as the revised reference case) conflict occurred between various interest groups and parties involved. The policy units involved in the route choice over the Medway section include at the supranational level the European Commission and at the national level Union Railways (UR) who act on behalf of the government (particularly the Department of Transport and the Department of Environment). Kent County Council (KCC) represent the regional-level policy unit involved and thereafter it is the local governments, which include the borough councils of Rochester, Gravesham, Ibnbridge arid Mailing, and Maidstone.
All of these policy units are represented by different actors who have different objectives concerning the CTRL. The European Commission objectives in terms of trans-European transport networks are: to provide better, safer travel at lower costs, and thus an increase in trade, while reducing costs and distances and creating scope for other activities; effective planning in Europe; and bridge-building towards Eastern Europe (Commission of the European Communities, 1994). The Department of Transport (DOT) presents objectives for the whole CTRL project which also correspond partially to the objectives of UR. The overriding objective of the DOT for the CTRL project was to increase the capacity between the Channel Tunnel and London, although the most important long-term objective was to put the whole project into the private sector. The DOT also expressed a need to provide a major increase in capacity and an improvement in the quality of journeys between Kent, Essex, and London to benefit domestic passengers. A further government objective was to provide the transport spine for the East Thames Corridor development (the Thames Gateway), thus shifting development pressure from the west to the east of London. The DOT was also keen to ensure that the shortest possible route was chosen at the lowest possible cost with minimum technical engineering problems-which implied that as much of the line as possible was to be on the surface, while taking into account environmental concerns. As the DOT is an actor at the national UK spatial policy level, these concerns are reflected in all individual decisions made at a lower policy level. These views correspond to those expressed by UR in terms of the issue of the route crossing the Medway.
In contrast, KCC expressed fewer and very different objectives in terms of the Medway routing, namely to minimise environmental damage (including concerns such as noise levels, vibration, and visual intrusion) and to keep the new high-speed rail line parallel to existing transport corridors. KCC's objectives in comparison with those of UR are much more specific in terms of their spatial dimension, as they have reference first to Kent and are more focused on the issue of the routing over the Medway, whereas UR's objectives often adopt a wider spatial agenda. The local authorities' objectives, which are even more spatially specific, include the minimisation of environmental damage but also the removal of lorries from the roads, a particular concern at the local level.
The statutory organisations' objectives are concerned mainly with limiting the damage to the respective interests and designations for which each is responsible. For example, English Heritage is specifically concerned with limiting the damage to Sites of Ancient Monuments; English Nature is particularly concerned with protecting nationally designated conservation areas, such as Sites of Special Scientific Interest.
The various policy units which have been mentioned were involved to some degree in the decisions over the two main routes over the Medway. This has led to conflicts at various spatial levels-horizontally between regional and local governments and vertically between supranational (Europe), national (UK Government as represented by UR), regional (County Council), and local government (Borough District Councils). Here it is conflicts with the supranational which are the main focus. At the supranational/national level the published route over the Medway would well serve the objectives of the European Commission for a high-speed track by providing a direct route and a cheaper option than the revised reference case alternative, which runs parallel to the M2 bridge (figure 2). However, this route also conflicted with national policies by cutting through nationally designated conservation areas, ancient woodlands, and agricultural land. In comparison the revised reference case would serve the supranational interests less well as this route would be slightly longer, slightly slower, and more costly owing to the need for a tunnel on the east bank of the Medway. This route also conflicted with nationally designated conservation areas, although potentially this could have been minimised with a significant section in tunnel. At the supranational regional level of conflict the published route would have conflicted with regional policies (which to an extent reflect national policies in terms of structure plans), and the criteria for the rail link set by KCC, of which the principal criterion was to keep the CTRL within existing road/rail link route corridors. The published route did not comply with this as it would be mainly a surface route through open countryside on either side of the River Medway, whereas the revised reference case (comprising a combination of the additional tunnelling options) would minimise the conflict with regional KCC policies by keeping the impact within the existing A2/M2 corridor, where construction and mitigation works could be coordinated with the M2 improvements.
At the supranational-local level of conflict the published route over the Medway would conflict with local policies (of Gravesend, Rochester, Tonbridge and Mailing, and Maidstone Borough/District Councils) and would impact on good agricultural land, on one of the few unspoiled and tranquil sections within a designated conservation area on the west bank, and on housing at Hailing, Holborough, Wouldham, and Burham on both banks. The revised reference case route over the Medway at this level would also conflict with local policies for landscape, woodland, designated conservation areas, and housing. In addition, conflicts arise from the disturbance caused by the M2 and CTRL works being concentrated in one corridor, with the new Medway rail bridge next to the existing road bridge.
On the 24th January 1994 the Secretary of State for Transport announced the Government's decision on the route of the rail link, which included the selection of the revised reference case of the River Medway. This did not, however, include final decisions on the route alignment in Ashford or the sites for intermediate stations.
The Ashford route
In 1989 UR proposed to go through the centre of Ashford town (the central, or safeguarded route), but with a fairly long section of tunnel. It was not the best engineering solution but did put the International Passenger Station (IPS, built in 1993 prior to any final decisionontherouting of"the^ CTRL but opened in January 1996) next to the domestic one. When UR reviewed their design in 1992 they found a cheaper route (by £85 million) around the north of Ashford (the northern route, or announced, route) alongside the M20 (figure 3).
Conflict occurred between various interest groups and policy units while they attempted to make a decision over the Ashford route. The policy units involved included at the supranational level the European Commission and at the national level the UR, who act on behalf of the government (specifically the DOT and the Department of the Environment). KCC represents the regional-level policy unit and Ashford Borough Council (ABC) represents the local government policy unit. As with the decision over the Medway crossing, all these policy units are represented by actors who hold particular objectives concerning the route through Ashford. The DOT objectives are as those expressed for the whole project (page 709). UR objectives, expressed specifically for the Ashford route decision, include minimising the cost and maximising the efficiency of the route while minimising the environmental effects. KCC, ABC, the then local Member of Parliament (Sir Keith Speed), and the then Member of the European Parliament (Christopher Jackson) collaborated on this issue with the combined objectives of: maximising the induced development benefits stemming from the IPS; saving time on journeys to Lille; a high-speed rail link for domestic travellers; and minimising environmental damage. The announced route accorded both with the supranational and with the national objectives, and provided a continuous and less costly high-speed track for all trains except those calling at Ashford. However, this route would not meet the regional (Kent-wide) longer-term objectives because the IPS could be served only from the existing rail lines. As these would retain the smaller loading gauge, only the original first-generation Eurostar trains would be able to use them, which could lead to fewer, or no, international services calling at Ashford. This restriction would be detrimental to the accessibility enjoyed by Kent residents and consequently to the potential economic benefits to Ashford and East Kent. Accordingly KCC, ABC, and many other organisations petitioned the prospective Bill over the route through the Ashford section. At the nexus between the supranational and local levels the announced route conflicted with a range of local (ABC Local Plan) policies. For example, it would have led to the severance of a new business park and to noise and impact on housing, would have required the rebuilding of part of the recently extended sewage works, and would have had landscape impacts. It would also have led to disruption to the M20 motorway and undermined the local interests based on the long-term future of the IPS (which coincided with those for the region). The safeguarded route (central route) would have met the supranational and national objectives, but at an additional cost originally estimated as £85 million, later revised to £60 million. The central route also imposed a time penalty on through trains because of an alignment which constrained speed on this section (although the full business impact was not published). In contrast, with the Northern Route, trains stopping at Ashford would have incurred a time penalty estimated as up to 15 minutes relative to the direct trains because of the need to use the existing track to gain access to the station. In contrast to the announced route this horizontal alignment would meet the regional longer-term objectives, for example ensuring there would be no impediments to the second-generation Eurostars calling at Ashford. As with the announced route the safeguarded route would conflict with a range of local policies, such as with the ABC local plan where landscape and countryside impacts west of Ashford would have resulted, as well as the severance of a Ministry of Defence site and severe impacts on businesses and property.
Specialist consultants declared that the announced route would have a lesser environmental impact and enable the link to still serve the central station via a connection called the Ashford Junction, albeit with a time penalty of approximately fifteen minutes. When this proposal was announced in 1993, the residents of Ashford and ABC started a strong campaign against the announced route. The borough council's main argument was that it would risk marginalising the town, as the train operators would be tempted to take the bypass rather than go via Ashford on the slower track. There was also a strong difference of opinion between UR and ABC as to the environmental impacts on each route and the balance of advantage between them in this respect, with UR seeing advantage in the announced route north of Ashford and ABC seeing advantage in the safeguarded route. Eventually the political pressures grew so much that the Government asked UR in January 1994 to have one more look at the route through the town. The borough council even provided a suggestion of their own which went to the south of Ashford (the southern route), although this was not well received in some of the affected areas.
The local MP for Ashford and ABC were passionate in their advocacy of the town centre route. But, by good chance, the Ministry of Defence was on the point of deciding to close Ashford Barracks, which had earlier been the reason for the long tunnel. This changed the decision circumstances. However, UR still had to provide connecting chords on each side of the town to enable the Eurostar trains and the new commuter trains to reach the station. Even though this route demolished more houses than the rest of the route and went through three industrial estates and a group of listed buildings, it was seen by the residents of Ashford, ABC, and the local MP as an acceptable environmental price to pay for the long-term strategic success of the area. Anywhere else, it was commented by UR, a route proposal of this nature would have been strongly opposed.
--------~ ~ Roger Freeman, Minister of Public Transport, announced the selection of the central route to be safeguarded for the new CTRL in April 1994. Commenting, he said that "The central route at Ashford is the right choice. It is environmentally acceptable, has the best financial return and it has won the most support locally. It meets local wishes that Ashford International Passenger Station should be served as directly as possible, so that new development can be attracted to the town for the benefit of East Kent as a whole" (Department of Transport, 1994). The Government's initial conversion to the view that the development of the rail line would have important economic benefits for the corridor served opened up a competition between local vested interests. However, as each competing site also needed a private-sector promoter to meet the government's requirements for private finance, the competition between the various locations was not just on the basis of their planning merits. It is possible that the most likely site for development (at Ebbsfleet) was entirely driven by the interests of the developer and not by the best interests of regional development. The role of the CTRL in regeneration, both in the East Thames Corridor and in East Kent, depends crucially on the development of international stations along the route. A station at Ashford was agreed by the Government in the Channel Tunnel Act (1987) as part of its commitment to a package of compensatory measures for Kent. This package had been committed well in advance of the proposal to develop the CTRL and has placed an additional constraint both on the route through Ashford (as discussed above), and on the developments of other potential sites.
Ashford International was opened on 8 January 1996 on the existing station site in the centre of the town and currently about 50% of all international trains stop there. This was some fourteen months after the start of international rail services, and two and half years after the original planned opening of the Channel Tunnel.
Although the decision on Ashford International had been taken independently of the CTRL, if the CTRL was to have any significance for regeneration in the East Thames Corridor, as the Government clearly hoped by its decision on the final route, additional stations would be required. As any other station would clearly be a competitor to Ashford International in the long term, this caused some problems. Because the Government's view was that all stations should be financed privately, and separately from the CTRL itself, this competition would affect the potential revenues from each station and cause operating difficulties for the railway, which would need to provide a service of adequate levels from each agreed station without damaging the overall revenue-creating potential of the entire route, on which the bulk of traffic would be end to end (namely London to Paris or Brussels). International stations at Ebbsfleet (between Dartford and Gravesend in the district councils of Dartford and Gravesham), at Purfleet (in the district council of Thurrock), and Rainham (in the borough of Havering) which are both in South Essex, and at Stratford (in the east London borough of Newham) were considered. In addition a domestic commuter station at Nashenden Valley (near the Medway Towns, in the district council of Rochester Upon Medway) was considered (figure 4). Each of these station options was represented by its local authority and various promoters. The objectives of these policy units for the development of any one station were consistent with needs to provide a catalyst for regeneration and a catchment to allow people to move from one mode of travel to another. This latter objective was important in encouraging people to leave their cars and in allowing access to international services by providing connections between existing lines and the new line. KCC's initial objective was for there to be no other station after the Ashford IPS but, once the decision had been made that there would be a second station, their objective was for it to be in Kent. The stations at Rainham, Purfleet, and Nashenden Valley were subsequently ruled out. That at Stratford, seen as the key site for urban regeneration in London, has been included as an element in the franchise. Provision for its possible development has to be included during construction, but it is extremely uncertain whether or not it will proceed. Outline agreement has been made with a private developer for a station and associated development at Ebbsfleet. This does have considerable potential for regeneration in the context of the East Thames Corridor concept as it is close to the M25 and provides scope for interchange with a possible new urban rail link (Union Metro, which would be separately financed) to serve areas between Ebbsfleet and Central London.
The report by UR adopted a detailed alignment for the easterly route through east London, terminating at King's Cross. An option of substituting the adjacent St Pancras station for King's Cross was included and was eventually favoured by Government. This cheaper option has had the knock-on effect of undermining the original proposals for the redevelopment of the whole of the King's Cross area. A northern terminal was desirable to improve cross-London connections (Waterloo is particularly badly situated for this) and it was estimated that, with a planned four international trains per hour in eachdirection,rthe five platformWaterlooterminaTwouldreachrsaturationpoint within ten years. However, the choice of the easterly route rather than the southerly route meant that virtually no time savings would be achieved on services to Waterloo because they would need to take a rather circuitous route back onto the classic network near the proposed Ebbsfleet station site. The southerly route would have served both terminals equally well.
As the Stratford option remains extremely uncertain, much of the rationale for the easterly route appears to have been lost. It is less advantageous to Kent commuter services, which need to gain access to the southerly terminals in London, and it is not clear what ultimate benefits have been gained by the seven-year delay over the route. Possible environmental benefits have been gained, but at the cost of an enormous planning blight over a large swathe of Kent and parts of both South and East London. The route is less desirable on transport grounds, being longer, less appropriate for regional services, and req U j r i n gthrough trains to destinations beyond London either to reverse at St Pancras or omit it completely. Ebbsfleet may prove to have regenerative benefits, but some of these will be at the expense of Ashford, to which commitments were made in 1986-87. Since in addition there is no commitment yet to connections to the line which would enable it to provide regeneration benefits to East Kent, these benefits, which were used to justify the use of government subsidy, may not be attained.
Objectives and outcomes
In this section we bring together the various dimensions of the conflict situation relating to CTRL in a tabular form which starts to classify the main areas of conflict. Table 1 (over) represents these conflicts in terms of the spatial policy units involved in the planning of the CTRL: the supranational level (European Commission and international railway agreements), the national level (Union Railways acting on behalf of the Government), the regional level (county councils), and the local level (borough/district councils). This representation provides a more detailed identification of conflicts within the framework set out in section 3.
Thus, cells 4, 7, and 9 of table 1 represent examples of horizontal conflicts arising between policy units that have the same role and weight with respect to a higher policy unit. Cells 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 represent examples of vertical conflict between policy units which are nested into each other, such as between the European Union and national planning, between national and regional planning, and between regional and local planning. These conflicts arise because of the different views and objectives of multiple policymakers and stakeholders (people who have a vested stake in the outcome of the decision), but also because of unequal spatial distributions of costs and benefits of policy.
Once we start to place real conflicts into the framework, however, it raises further issues. In particular it suggests the need to consider a temporal as well as a spatial dimension. When conflicts are identified, and decisions taken, the outcome will affect the overall evaluation of a project. As the decisionmaking process in which these conflicts arise takes a number of years to complete, certain elements of the conflict circumstances may change. For example, the selection of the central route through Ashford was partially because of the closure of the Ashford Barracks, therefore no longer requiring the long tunnel option which had been one of the reasons for the original conflict over the northern or central routes. This raises a question: at what stage of the decisionmaking process should the nature of the conflict be assessed?
It also suggests a possible area for further research to see whether it is possible to develop a methodology for assessing conflicts continuously throughout a decisionmaking process rather than at a static point.
The reason these issues become particularly important is the way that various formsr~df~nritrgation developnduririgthen^oursenof the ttiscussiorr^of a project:,^ofterT as a means of attempting to resolve potential conflicts before they become actual conflicts. Such mitigation can be in the form of changes to a route or to the technical specification of the project (such as noise barriers, more tunnelling, etc), or through compensation. It has been seen throughout the long history of the CTRL project that all of these elements have become important and, as decisions are clearly path dependent, there will be a strong element of parties learning from previous events. The promoters of the scheme have learnt how to present a project more effectively, and to consult with the public over feasible changes to a proposal. Those who may suffer from the consequences of the project have learnt how best to present their case in order to maximise the benefit to themselves through whatever form of mitigation is on offer. Mitigation can therefore be seen as a way of resolving conflicts in the decisionmaking process.
Conclusion
The principal lesson from this history is that hesitation and delay by governments bowing to environmental pressure and being caught up with the insistence of the need to involve private finance do not necessarily provide a better project. However, a better project may result by specifying and representing environmental and economic policy objectives, policy data, and expected policy outcomes in a transparent and unified spatial framework. By attempting to measure the degree of achievement of vertical and horizontal conflicts, which have partially contributed to this extended planning process, it may be possible in future projects of this nature to predict the most sensitive aspects of the policy.
In this paper we have simply sketched out the initial approach to trying to make sense of a very protracted set of decisions that have provoked an enormous amount of conflict, considerable environmental and social damage, and have only just yielded a final decision to proceed with the project, which still awaits the necessary privatesector funding. In the long run an approach such as the one outlined here should enable a much better picture to be obtained before the planning of a project is even started by identifying the sources and types of conflict which may be encountered. In doing this it should be possible to improve decisionmaking and the overall evaluation of projects.
